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The study investigates the plausibility of an active to passive transition, the impact of crises on 
the potential transition, and the performance-flow relationship of both active and passive 
investment products, which includes US equity, open-end and ETF, funds. The analysis 
compares active and passive funds through the lens of fund flows, absolute returns, and risk-
adjusted returns. The study shows that there seemed to be an active to passive transition from 
2007 – 2019 and that 2020 – 2021 exhibits measures that could describe changes in the active to 
passive narrative. A performance-flow relationship exists across both active and passive funds. 
Passive funds see larger fund inflows for better returns except during crises (2007 – 2009, 2020 – 
2021). Active funds demonstrate higher performance sensitivities to all absolute and risk-
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Over the past few years, there has been a widespread claim that active management is 
losing ground to passive management strategies. Regardless, there truly has been an increase in 
passively managed funds with the rise of index funds and ETFs as well as new investment 
platforms to invest through. According to Kenechukwu et al. (2020), active management 
strategies are strategies that give portfolio managers discretion in selecting individual securities. 
Often active managers have the objective of seeking to outperform an identified benchmark 
through actively selecting individual stocks that will outperform that benchmark. Passive 
management strategies, which include indexing, are rules-based investing strategies that often 
track an index by holding all holdings in the index or a representative sample of part of the 
index.  
One of the biggest perceived benefits of active management strategies is the ability of 
managers to not only pick “winner” securities but to also manage capital better on a day-to-day, 
month-to-month, and year-to-year basis than passive strategies. Investors have seemed to 
increasingly write off this perceived benefit and have moved more steadily into passive 
management strategies. Research done by Kenechukwu et al. (2020) finds that passive investors 
are less performance sensitive than those of active funds, which may be a result of investor 
purpose or investor selection. Given the recent COVID-19 pandemic, it is important to 
understand how active and passive fund flows react to performance during crises as well as 
analyze potential contributing factors that may be influencing fund flows during the COVID-19 
crisis as compared to the 2007 - 2009 financial crisis or even a period of normal performance 
(2010 - 2019).  
Assuming that investors are rational and that they desire to choose the funds that will 
deliver them the best performance over time. We should be able to assume that investors are 
performance sensitive and use historical performance of funds as a basis for positive or negative 
fund flows. Over the past few years from around 2009 to the present the amount of assets 
invested in passive investment strategies (AUM or assets under management) has grown faster 
than the growth in active AUM. More recently, from the data collected it seems that the amount 
of AUM for passive open-end and ETF (exchange traded funds) funds has overshadowed those 
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with active investment strategies. At a high level there must be a performance to fund-flow 
relationship driving the increase in passive fund AUM over the increase in active fund AUM.  
 
There has already been a significant amount of previous research done on the active to 
passive transition. Overall, there remains significant debate around whether active management 
truly delivers outperformance for investors over passive funds and debate around what is driving 
the accelerated fund flow into passive strategies over that of active strategies. There is empirical 
support on both sides regarding whether active management strategies have merit or not.  
Many researchers against active management strategies seem to question active’s abilities 
to consistently outperform the index and the actual returns to investors with the higher fee 
potential. Sharpe (1966) seemed to suggest that between 1954 – 1963 the average actively 
managed mutual fund slightly lagged a diversified portfolio based upon an index after deducting 
expenses. Chung et. al (2017) focused on Korea’s NPS Funds and found that after costs, the state 
was better off adopting a passive management strategy for its state funds. Porter and Trifts 
(2014) tracked 1800 mutual fund managers between 1928 – 2008. They found that longer 
tenured managers tended to outperform their shorter tenured counterparts, but for managers with 
a tenure of at least 10 years, the likelihood of outperformance was just as likely as inferior 
performance. Walden (2015) found that pension fund performance differs during periods of 
economic growth and periods of economic decline but generally that low-fee diversified 
investment portfolios generally provide better returns than actively managed investments of state 
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pension funds. On a broad note, this body of research and other similar research seem to support 
the current mainstream belief that passively managed funds generally outperform actively 
managed funds. 
However, there have also been arguments for the opposite point of view. Fortin and 
Michelson (2002) shared similar findings as Walden (2015) where they found that index funds 
tended to outperform actively managed funds on a total return and risk adjusted basis. However, 
they also found that managed funds seemed to outperform going into and out of a period of 
recession. Glode (2011) found that U.S active equity mutual funds realized significantly better 
performance in bad states of the economy over normal states. Such research and others provide 
some basis that seem to lend credibility to the abilities of actively managed fund managers to 
provide unique capabilities in times of crises. This finding is especially relevant given the 
broader COVID-19 pandemic and potential findings from our analysis during this period 
compared to previous crises. Shiller (1981) found that price movements are too volatile to be 
consistent with simple efficient market models, which are a key argument in favor of passive 
investment strategies. Lastly, Kosowski (2006) found that between 1962 and 2005 mutual fund 
risk adjusted performance during recessions exceeded those in expansion by 3 – 5% per year on 
average. Ultimately there remains significant research that continues to suggest actively managed 
strategies remain effective and purposeful.  
At the very root of the debate is whether active managers illustrate skill to the extent that 
an investment in an active fund generates the necessary risk-adjusted return for investors over a 
benchmark. According to Walden (2015), passive managers believe it is hard to beat the market 
if they are efficient and that active cannot consistently beat passive management strategies. At its 
core, active management necessitates dependence upon the knowledgeable and skills of a 
manager to “beat the market”. There has been evidence from Crane and Crotty (2018) that index 
fund skill exists, is persistent, and potentially found in proportions like those of active funds; 
furthermore, t-statistics between active and passive funds show that active funds perform no 
better than index funds. However, Brown and Davies (2017) identified that the growth of passive 
strategies has pushed down active manager’s fees which is correlated with lower managerial 
effort. However, truly active managers are persistently skilled and add $3.2 million per year, 
where half is due to market timing and stock picking and the other half due to diversification 
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services. Altogether there remains significant debate surrounding active and passive 
outperformance and where that skill potentially exists.  
Ultimately skill and performance matter. Berk and Green (2004) suggest that investors 
appear to identify skilled managers and determine their compensation through the flow-
performance relation. Berk and Binsbergen (2015) find that the average manager is skilled and 
adds $3.2 million per year, which is not attributable to luck. If arguments in favor of active 
management are true and active managers are persistently skilled and add value, then active fund 
performance during crises should be better than those of passive and should see appropriate fund 
inflows.  
The findings from this research do reflect a larger active to passive transition at least 
before the pandemic (2020 - 2021). Looking specifically at the COVID-19 pandemic, this period 
is the first that describes a change in the active to passive transition based upon summary 
statistics. The data also suggests a stronger performance-flow relationship for actively managed 
funds than for passively managed funds. However, it is important to note that this relationship 
still exists for passively managed funds but is not as significant during crises, which suggests 
passive investors are less likely to pull out money during crises than active investors. At the 
same time, the data suggests that passive funds are better rewarded for a one unit increase in 
absolute and risk-adjusted returns, and active funds seem to be slightly better rewarded for 
increased performance during crises compared to passive funds. Altogether, our analysis 
supports the assumption that both active and passive investors are performance sensitive and use 
the historical performance of funds as a basis for positive or negative fund flows.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data, data sources, and the data 
cleaning process. Section 3 compares fund flows and returns between and within strategies and 
over different periods using different statistical methods. Section 4 analyzes the impact of funds’ 
performance, both absolute and risk-adjusted, on fund flows using linear regressions with 
individual regressions by period. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with key takeaways, 






Data was retrieved primarily through Morningstar Direct and WRDS CRSP. Additional 
data such as S&P500 index pricing and Russell 2000 index pricing were pulled from S&P 
NetAdvantage. Data for the Fama French 3 factor model was pulled from the Fama French 
Dartmouth website.  
The primary data point of estimated net fund flows was retrieved from Morningstar 
Direct. This data detailed at the fund level what the monthly redemptions or additions to each 
fund was for both passive and active open-end mutual funds or ETF equity funds. This data was 
pulled in for the period January 2006 through February 2021. Monthly returns were also pulled 
in at the share level from Morningstar Direct. Unfortunately, there was not a fund level return 
data point in Morningstar’s system so in lieu of that our analysis instead pulls in a fund’s oldest 
share class monthly return. The identifying information of CUSIP and ticker were also pulled in 
for each fund.  
Initially, CUSIPs from Morningstar Direct were utilized to retrieve monthly price data 
from WRDS to compute a monthly return for passive funds. Price data was retrieved between 
January 2006 and December 2020 from WRDS CRSP. Monthly returns for passive funds were 
then calculated based upon the change in fund prices. However, after cleaning the data and 
filtering down for the analysis, it was revealed that the number of monthly returns from WRDS 
CRSP were severely limited compared to the number of funds and months available. Ultimately, 
for both active and passive funds the monthly return data was acquired from Morningstar Direct 
with only the oldest fund share class being used in the analysis.  
Data overall was cleaned to exclude missing or 0 values for both fund flow and returns. 
Furthermore, the first 12 months of returns were excluded from the analysis given the volatile 
nature of returns during the early life of a fund.  
The data was segmented into three distinct time periods for summary statistics and 
analysis. Those three periods were 2007 – 2009, 2010 – 2019, and 2020 – 2021. Statistics 
calculated for fund flows and returns reflect statistics around monthly fund flows and returns 
during the designated periods. The 6-month return was calculated on a moving basis using the 
following formula: ((R1 + 1) * (R2+1) * (R3+1) * (R4+1) * (R5+1) * (R6+1)) - 1. R6 represents 
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the current monthly return and R1 represents the monthly returns from 5 periods ago. Missing 
returns within the 6-month calculation would be filtered out. 
Fund Flow and Fund Performance Comparison: 
I. Fund Flows 
Fund flows represent where investors are moving their money. Looking at the fund flows 
between different strategies allows us to understand investor preferences over time. This section 
looks to compare fund flows between active and passive strategies and within strategies over 
different periods to describe the active to passive transition.  
 
Within our data, we assume the beginning of the year as the beginning of the crisis. So 
1/1/2007 for the financial crisis and 1/1/2020 for the COVID crisis. For the following charts, the 
N+0 period is assumed to be the start of the crisis in the given year (1/1/2007 for the financial 
crisis and 1/1/2020 for the COVID crisis). 
The data for fund flows seems to illustrate that total passive fund flows during the 
COVID-19 pandemic and during the financial crisis were better than total fund flows from active 
funds. What is interesting is that specifically for the financial crisis there seemed to be a spike in 
passive fund flows and an exodus of active fund flows during the periods N+17 to N+24. 
Furthermore, during the COVID-19 pandemic, passive funds seemed to see fewer total 





From an initial assessment of total fund flows for active investment products during the 
2007 - 2009 financial crisis and 2020 – 2021 COVID crisis, active funds saw larger and more 
consistent fund outflows during the COVID crisis than the financial crisis. Given the lack of time 
periods since the beginning of the COVID crisis it will be interesting to see how fund flows for 
active funds progress given the longer-term outflows seen with the financial crisis. Alternatively, 
the fund flows for passive funds during the 2007-09 financial crisis remained strong, but during 
the COVID pandemic it saw a short term drop before rebounding.  
Another way to compare and analyze active and passive managed funds is to utilize t-
tests. Data between the two strategies and between different periods were compared to each other 
to derive statistical significance. The first approach utilized overall fund flow data between the 




Altogether the data suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a significant difference between the passive and active populations of fund flows at the 95% 
confidence level. As seen by the t-statistic, there is a significant difference between passive and 
active fund flows (15.49) with very low p-values to support the conclusion that this did not come 




The analysis was extended to compare data from distinct time periods within strategies to 
themselves. To do so, data within strategies separated by period were compared to each other to 
determine statistical meaning.  
The passive t-test suggests that between 2007 and 2010 there is no significance between 
the means of their respective fund flows. This could suggest that at least between those two 
periods there is no difference in what is driving fund flows. Comparing the same periods for 
active, there is a significant difference between the means of fund flows between the two 
periods. 
Looking at the 2010 vs. the 2020 period, fund flows are significantly different between 
the two periods for both strategies. For passive strategies, the fund flows show a somewhat small 
t-stat of 4.39. Interestingly, for active fund flows the difference in t-statistics between this 
comparison in this period versus the previous comparison are significant (-15.17 vs. -5.63). 
Finally, there are interesting findings for the 2007 vs. 2020 period. For starters, passive 
fund flows between the two periods are statistically significant but remain small in scale. 
Together with the previous findings, the 2020 – 2021 period is the only one that is significantly 
different from the other two. Regarding active funds, fund flow trends remained the same where 
fund flows were significantly different with a large t-stat of -13.30. 
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Overall, active strategies saw larger and more significant differences between periods for 
fund flows over what was seen from passive strategies. This is reflective or greater overall 
change impacting the active strategy fund class. Passive fund flows saw differences when 
comparing the two earlier periods to the 2020 – 2021 period. The small differences in fund flows 
for 2020 cold suggest that there is a disruption in the general fund inflow trend that has been seen 
in past periods. At the same time, active strategies saw significant differences across all three 
periods for fund flows, which may illustrate the dynamic changes that are affecting funds within 
that strategy class. 
 
Framing the data to compare active and passive fund flows during the same periods we 
are able to extrapolate that there are certain relationships between the two. In the 2007 – 2009 
period we are able to claim that there is a significant albeit somewhat small difference between 
active and passive fund flows, Through the 2010 – 2019 period there is also significant 
difference between active and passive fund flows during this period but the t-statistic is much 
larger (17.76). Interestingly, in the 2020 – 2021 period there is no statistical relationship between 
active and passive fund flows with a p-value of 0.13. This is also the first period where the t-stat 
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is negative. As a result, the 2020 – 2021 period stands out in the active to passive transition 
narrative and could suggest changes to come.  




Segmenting the data into specific periods based on active and passive strategies helps 
reveal some interesting summary statistics about the data. During the 2007-2009 crisis active 
funds saw more fund outflows on a mean, median, and sum basis. At the same time, passive 
funds during this period also seemed to see the most extreme outflows and inflows as suggested 
by the minimum and maximum. 
From 2010-2019 active funds saw significant total inflows but were outpaced by passive 
inflows. This may reflect a greater appreciation for passive management strategies following the 
2007-2009 financial crisis and is likely a factor that helped passive management AUM rise to 
comparative/slightly greater levels today. Additionally, fund inflows for passive funds were 
much greater than inflows for active funds on a mean, median, and sum basis. 
Finally, during the COVID-19 crisis starting January 2020 through March 2021 the story 
somewhat changes from past periods. Total fund inflows for actively managed funds exceeded 
those from passively managed funds during this period. There is a potential risk of outliers 
within this data with some passive funds seeing extensive outflows; however, restricting the data 
for passive to between -10 and +10 billion still sees lower fund inflows for passive strategies. It 
is important to note that further research with greater diligence is necessary. At the same time, 
active funds saw greater inflows on a mean and median basis over that of passive funds. 
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Overall, the data seems to support the story of greater asset inflows for passively 
managed investment funds over those from actively managed funds. Throughout 2007 – 2019, 
passive fund flows saw greater fund flows on average than those from active funds, which 
suggests that investors were moving more money into passive funds than active funds during this 
time. At the same time, recent fund flow data from t-tests and summary statistics suggest that the 
more recent 2020 – 2021 period reveals differences in fund flows, which could illustrate a 
change in the active to passive shift or be an uncontrolled statistical error. Altogether, future 
research on the potential of the 2020 – 2021 period and its potential significance in the active to 
passive transition could yield greater insight.  
II. Funds’ Absolute Returns 
One key driver of investor fund flows is the return that funds and their managers provide 
to them. This section looks to compare the absolute returns of funds (non-abnormal and before 
fees) between strategies and within strategies over time to understand how returns have played a 
role in the active to passive transition.  
 
Looking at active and passive absolute returns between the two crises, it is interesting 
that the median performance for the two strategies seemed to be closely aligned with each other 






Going a bit deeper, the median active fund performance during the COVID pandemic 
saw a sharp drop earlier on than the financial crisis and saw a quicker recovery as well. The 
continued recovery remains to be seen given the limited available data.  
At the same time, the performance of passive funds during the 2007-2009 crisis in the 
beginning seemed to remain flat before seeing sharp dips and recoveries later. Passive funds 
during the pandemic seem to have generally seen an initial sharp dip and continued recovery 
ever since. 
Furthermore, a t-test was created to analyze the returns between both strategies and 
between different periods like what was seen for the analysis of fund flows. Figure 14 uses 




According to the results from the t-test, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
there is a significant difference between the returns for active and passive funds at the 95% 
confidence level. The t-statistic of the test for the returns is somewhat small and negative at -3.85 
but still statistically significant. 
  
  
The analysis was again conducted within strategies where data from different periods 
were compared to each other to understand differences in returns over different periods. 
Between 2007 and 2010 there is a significant difference between the means of passive 
returns with a significant t-statistic of-13.87 and the means of active returns with a t-statistic of -
16.45. Both t-statistics from the returns data is larger than the t-statistics seen with the fund flows 
data, which were -5.63 for active funds and -1.85 for passive funds. This suggests that the return 
differences are much greater than the differences between fund flows for both strategies.  
Comparing the 2010 period to the 2020 period there are significant and large differences 
between returns across both strategies. The passive return t-statistic of -18.05 is still much 
greater than the 4.39 t-statistic that the strategy sees in fund flows, which could suggest that there 
are greater differences in returns during this period compared to fund flows. Active funds still 
see significant and large differences between periods for returns, but the t-statistic of the returns 
are only slightly greater than that of fund flows (-26.35 vs. -15.17).  
Finally, the t-test comparing 2007 to 2020 mirror what was seen in the 2010 vs. 2020 
comparison. Both strategies see significant and large differences between returns across both 
periods. Fund flow differences still stand where active funds had similar t-stats between fund 
flows and returns but passive strategies had larger t-statistics for returns than fund flows.  
Overall, passive returns saw much larger differences between returns across the three 
periods than it did for fund flows. Across periods, active generally saw much larger differences 
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for fund flows and slightly larger differences for returns when compared to passive funds as seen 
by the different t-stats. Interestingly, across all three periods for both strategies there were large 
and significant differences between the mean returns, which suggests that returns between all 
three periods are very different from each other. 
 
Comparing the data between active and passive returns within periods yields interesting 
results. The 2007 – 2009 period saw no statistical significance difference between passive and 
active returns. But this changed starting with the 2010 – 2019 period which saw a small 
difference between active and passive returns, which continued into the 2020 – 2021 period. The 
data seems to suggest that over time the differences between active and passive returns are 
becoming more significant and increasingly large. Increased differences between the returns 
could suggest that one of the strategies may be seeing greater returns, which could affect fund 
flows if the performance-flow relationship exists.  
Summary statistics were calculated for both strategies for same-month and 6-month 





Over the 2007 – 2009 crisis period, average monthly performance for active was better 
than passive, while both performed the same at the median. Using standard deviation as a proxy 
for risk, active funds for same-month and 6-month returns had lower std. deviations during this 
period than that of passive funds. 
During the 2010 – 2019 period, the mean and median return of actively managed funds 
seemed to be slightly better than those of passive. Given the data does not reflect performance 
after fees, it could be possible that the after-fee performance of active funds did not compare to 
those of the average or median passive fund. Interestingly, the maximum 6-month performance 
of active funds was less than the maximum performance from the best performing passive fund. 
While not conclusive the difference between the 6-month and 1-month maximum returns 
between the two strategies could reflect the findings of Porter and Trifts (2014), which found that 
active managers fail to persistently outperform the market when measuring performance using 
Carhart or Jensen alphas. However, this finding is not supported by the findings using the 
median or mean 6-month and 1-month returns. Lastly, during this period std. dev again for 
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passive funds is slightly greater than those from active funds for both 1-month and 6-month 
returns.  
Lastly, over the course of the COVID pandemic (2020 – 2021) the mean and median 
return during this period from active beat those from passive, while the lowest return for active 
was better than passive’s lowest return. The data during this period seems to reflect the findings 
of Fortin and Michelson (2002) and Glode (2011) where active mutual funds see better 
performance going into and out of recessions. However, the best monthly passive return during 
this period and over a 6-month period beat out those of the best active performance. Lastly, the 
standard deviation during this period was also lower for active funds than passive funds.  
At the same time, it seems that actively managed strategies on average see better single 
month returns and 6-month aggregated returns over those of passive funds; this is the case at 
least before fees, expenses, and other considerations. The data also reveals that the median active 
fund on an aggregated 6-month period saw better returns than those of passive during the two 
crises, while slightly underperformed passive between 2010-2019. However, the best passive 
funds seem to increasingly beat out those of the best actively managed funds. Interestingly, the 
standard deviations of active funds were consistently lower than that of passive funds across all 
three periods. Ultimately, the different findings provide support for both sides of the active 
versus passive debate but at least suggest that the debate between the two strategies is merited. 
III. Funds’ Risk Adjusted Returns 
The summary statistics were also calculated for the funds’ risk-adjusted returns using the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Fama French 3 Factor Model (FFM) during the period 
2020 – 2021. The S&P 500 and Russell 2000 were both used as separate potential benchmarks 
for the CAPM. Risk-adjusted returns here illustrate the outperformance of a fund during a given 
month over and above a benchmark. Given the performance-flow relationship, outperformance is 




Active seems to see slight outperformance on a mean and median basis using all three 
models over those from passive funds. At the same time, the minimum and maximum from 
active also seem to be better than those from passive. This suggests that before fees, active funds 
do generally see outperformance over the index during the most recent crisis. Further research 
should look to specific fund fees to calculate the after-fee returns to investors for more concrete 
conclusions. However, what this data illustrates is that active funds on average have higher 
abnormal returns over passive funds, and the fee gap for the two strategies is likely essential to 
the active to passive transition narrative.  
Impact of Funds’ Performance on Fund Flows: 
I. Fund Flows’ and Absolute Returns 
Our analysis looks to primarily analyze the relation between fund flows and performance 
using primarily linear regressions. The findings from these models will support the analysis of 
the active vs. passive debate, fund-performance relationships, and the impact of crises.  
For the initial regression analysis, fund flow data and monthly returns were initially 
captured in Microsoft Excel before being transmuted through Python for the regression analysis. 
The regression itself involved regressing actual monthly fund performance against related 
monthly fund flows. The model assumes that fund flows are the independent variable and are 
dependent upon various fund performance metrics. The R2 value returned a tiny fraction of a 
percentage for both active and passive funds, which represented that very little to none of the 
fund flow changes were explained by the performance of the funds themselves. At the same 
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time, the correlation between fund flows and these returns also remained low. While this was 
somewhat expected for passive funds, but the fact that active funds also had a low R2 value of 
0.00268 was surprising given the amount of previous research around active investment 
strategies.   
Based upon the initial results, one hypothesis was that investors may not look at current 
month performance and instead should look at past performance as a basis for evaluating their 
investment decision. To do so, the model isolates previous month fund performance for each 
fund and then regressed fund flows against that new data set for each fund. The resulting active 
R2 value of 0.00241 remained below expected values of an assumed performance related 
relationship with fund in or outflows.  
From there the model was extended to evaluate the regression of fund flows to a 6-month 
moving return given the potential that investors may look at returns over a longer time horizon. 
These results saw slight improvement but still failed to describe much of the fund flow variation. 
However, the data overall yielded statistically significant results that coupled with return 




What is surprising about the results from active funds is that the independent variables 
(returns) are statistically significant, below 0.05, given by the very low p-values for all three 
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periods. At the same time, the regression models for passive managed funds found similar 
significance levels across all measures with R2 levels below those of active funds. One 
hypothesis is that different funds have different amounts of AUM and fund inflows or outflows 
not in a % amount would give the current model significant difficulty in explaining the variation.  
The p-values across all three of the performance metrics were significant for both 
strategies. However, active funds saw significance levels greater than those seen by passive 
funds. This can be seen for same month returns (3.49*10-88 vs. 6.29*10-13), previous month 
returns (1.45*10-79 vs. 0.00131), and especially for 6-month returns (3.95*10-266 vs. 3.34*10-16). 
On the other hand, return coefficients from passive funds are generally slightly larger than those 
from active funds. For a one unit change in same month returns, active funds would see average 
fund inflows of $69 million and passive funds saw an inflow of around $168 million. A one unit 
increase in previous month returns would see active inflows of $65.6 million and passive inflows 
of $74.9 million. Finally, a one unit increase in 6-month returns would see active inflows of $46 
million and passive inflows of $74.9 million. Altogether this suggests that passive funds 
generally see more inflows with better performance metrics over the same performance change 
in active funds. This disparity is the most severe with same month returns which see almost a 
2.6x greater increase in passive funds than active funds as a result. This could suggest that the 
market for passive funds is generally greater than that of passive funds because that return 
metrics are more significant for active funds but active still sees lower fund inflows given the 
lower return coefficients; however, this is not conclusive. 
The model was extended to evaluate the performance and fund flow relationship within 
different periods of time for both asset classes. This analysis will help determine if crises are 






Throughout the 2007 – 2009 period, active funds saw high significance levels across all 
three-performance metrics while passive funds saw little to no significance with the same 
metrics. Overlooking the significance levels for passive funds, active funds saw higher fund 
inflows per unit increase in same month ($63 vs. $58 million) and previous month returns ($62.8 
vs. $27 million), but passive fund flows saw greater inflows in 6-month returns ($24 million for 
active vs. approx. $28 million for passive).  
Looking at the 2010 – 2019 period, active funds saw greater significance in return 
metrics than passive funds for same month returns (1.75*10-22 vs. 3.32*10-22), previous month 
(2.14*10-25 vs. 1.53*10-5), and especially 6-month returns (1.09*10-105 vs. 3.27*10-20). However, 
passive funds generally saw greater return coefficients. For a one unit change in same month 
returns, active funds would see $47 million in inflows while passive funds would see $318 
million in inflows. A one unit increase in previous month returns would see around $50 million 
active inflows versus almost $142 million passive inflows. Lastly, for a one unit change in 6-
month returns active funds would see inflows of $46.7 million versus passive inflows of $132.7 
million. This is interesting because during this period passive funds saw tremendous fund 
inflows over those of active funds while also seeing slightly lower mean and median fund return 
metrics in summary statistics (outside of the median 6-month). The findings could suggest that 
although passive investors are somewhat performance sensitive, creating the performance – flow 
relationship during this period, this may not have been the primary driver for fund inflows during 
this period given the slightly better performance of active funds during this period. Nevertheless, 
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passive funds were generally less sensitive and better rewarded for better performance when 
compared to passive funds during this period.  
Lastly, the 2020 – 2021 period saw active performance metrics see greater significance 
than the same metrics for passive funds, where passive same month and previous month returns 
were not significant at all. Interestingly, return coefficients for active funds were similar if not 
greater than those from passive funds. For same month returns active funds would see almost 
$90 million in fund inflows versus passive inflows of $52 million. Looking at previous month 
returns; active funds would see around $75 million in inflows while passive funds would see 
almost $8 million. Finally, active funds saw inflows on average around $75 million versus $74 
million for passive funds with 6-month returns.  
The lack of significance for both crisis periods from passive funds suggests that during 
crises passive investors are less likely to use near term performance as a method for determining 
fund flows. This reflects previous research from Kenechukwu et al. (2020) which suggests that 
passive investors are less performance sensitive or at least that near term performance is less of a 
driver for passive investor fund flows than it is for active fund flow. At the same time, return 
coefficients during both crises suggest that active funds see more inflows for a one unit increase 
in performance than passive funds during crises. 
Ultimately, the regression analysis for both strategies confirms our assumption that 
investors are rational and choose funds that will return them the best performance over time. The 
combined data suggests that the different performance metrics are significant in predicting fund 
flows across both strategies. Breaking down the data into distinct periods reveals that passive 
fund performance during crises are not significant predictors of passive fund flows, but this 
relationship does become significant in periods of “normalcy” (2010-2019). Interestingly the 
data separated by period suggests that active funds in crisis periods generally see greater fund 
inflow per unit change in performance, but this depends on the performance metric utilized in the 
regression. The combined data finds higher inflows for passive funds across all three metrics. 
This could be the case for many different reasons but likely it is because during periods of 
normal performance passive funds are much better rewarded than active investors for a one unit 




II. Fund Flows’ and Risk-Adjusted Returns 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a tool used to evaluate the abnormal/ risk 
adjusted returns of a security or fund over a market expected return, like the S&P 500 or the 
Russell 2000. Using the data provided we regressed the fund’s monthly returns against the 
benchmark returns (either the S&P 500 as the SPX or the Russell 2000 as RUS 2000) in the same 
period to get the beta for each fund. We then used that beta to calculate a fund’s abnormal or risk 
adjusted return for each month based upon the designated benchmark and regressed fund flows 
against this new variable. This is especially important for active managed funds that seek to beat 
a benchmark index.  
Additionally, one of the hypotheses in the initial regressions was that investors looked to 
returns in the previous month when making investment decisions. This idea was extended to the 
now risk-adjusted returns and regressed against fund flows.  
 
 
As with the initial regressions, all factors for active and passive strategies are statistically 
significant to varying extents but fail to explain the variation in fund flows. Generally active 
funds see much greater significance in the risk-adjusted returns than passive funds which 
supports the idea that active investors are more performance sensitive. Interestingly, passive 
funds saw greater return coefficients for all metrics. This could suggest that passive investors are 
less concerned with outperformance over a benchmark, but greater outperformance by as passive 
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is more heavily rewarded than outperformance by active funds, which may expect 
outperformance.  
Initial regressions illustrated great changes and differences when the data was split into 
time periods and then regressed. This analysis was extrapolated to abnormal returns for both 
strategies to see if similar patterns existed.  
 
 
Over the 2007 – 2009 period, active funds saw risk-adjusted returns and risk-adjusted 
past returns as significant predictors of fund flows. Generally, a one unit increase in performance 
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by active funds would be rewarded with $120 - $135 million in fund inflows. On the other hand, 
passive funds saw all but the SPX benchmark same-month risk-adjusted return as being non-
significant. A one unit change in risk-adjusted returns in passive funds with the SPX as a 
benchmark would see almost twice as much in inflows over that of active funds ($266 million for 
passive vs. $134 million for active). On the other hand, the other measures, while not statistically 
significant, saw return coefficients like those from active funds.  
Interestingly, that data from the 2010 – 2019 period varies between strategies. SPX same-
month returns and RUS same-month returns generally were more significant for passive funds, 
while previous month returns were more significant for active funds. Active funds generally saw 
much smaller return coefficients across all measures when compared to passive funds. For a one 
unit increase in SPX same month returns passive funds saw inflows of $438 million and $355 
million versus $59.7 million and $129 million for active funds. A one unit increase in the CAPM 
for the Rus 2000 same and previous month returns would on average see a $410 million and 
$271 million inflow for passive funds and a $64.9 million and $104 million inflow for active 
funds. Passive funds during this period of normalcy were better rewarded for risk-adjusted 
outperformance compared to active funds.  
Lastly, during the COVID crisis, active funds saw greater significance of CAPM metrics 
over that of passive funds. Metrics involving the Russell 2000 were not significant for passive 
funds while the S&P 500 metrics were. Active funds saw lower return coefficients versus passive 
funds. For a one unit change in risk-adjusted returns using the SPX as a benchmark active funds 
would see $182 million in fund inflows vs. $271 million from passive funds. A one unit change 
in previous-month SPX returns would see inflows of $231 million for active and $370 million 
for passive. Using the Russell 2000 as a benchmark with a one unit increase in performance, 
active funds would see $69.5 million in inflows while passive funds would see $198 million. 
Lastly, a one-unit increase in previous-month Russell 2000 CAPM returns active funds would 
see $94.1 million over $39.8 million in passive inflows.  
During both crises, the abnormal returns of passive funds over the Russel 2000 proved to 
not be significant variables in predicting fund flows. However, CAPM for SPX remained 
statistically important throughout all three periods for passive funds. Additionally, previous 
month CAPM SPX changed from being not significant in 2007 - 2009 to being significant in 
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2020 - 2021. The results for the RUS 2000 generally reflect the findings from the initial 
regression analysis using different periods and absolute returns. Interestingly the return 
coefficients for passive funds during both crises generally exceed those of active funds, which 
somewhat differs to what was seen with absolute return metrics. This could reiterate the idea that 
outperformance in passive funds is more rewarded than outperformance from active funds.  
The importance of abnormal returns calculated through the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
is expected for actively managed strategies. Over the past few years, active funds have 
increasingly been compared to passive index benchmarks, like the S&P 500, and have been 
forced to justify expenses through beating this index. However, the fact that the abnormal returns 
calculated by the model are sometimes significant for passive funds and generally significant for 
the combined data suggests that outperformance is generally a predictor for passive management 
fund flows. While this significance decreases during crises, the relationship overall largely 
remains. The results for active funds generally confirm previous research from Kenechukwu et 
al. (2020) that finds active investors are more performance sensitive than passive investors. 
However, the fact that the passive fund CAPM returns showed significance when using the S&P 
500 as a benchmark reflects research from Crane and Crotty (2018) that found a flow-
performance relationship in passive funds when using the Fama-French-Carhart model. At the 
same time, Crane and Crotty also found that index fund skill exists, which together with the 
findings from this model reflects that passive investors are looking for skilled passive funds that 
realize outperformance like active investor preferences. Altogether, the performance-flow 
relationship for both strategies exists with risk-adjusted returns; additionally, passive funds seem 
to generally be better rewarded for increased in outperformance.  
The Fama French 3 Factor Model (FFM) attempts to provide the same information as the 
CAPM but more accurately and using three variables in the calculation process. The three factors 
in the model’s analysis are: the market risk premium, small minus big, and high minus low. All 
three data points are calculated and retained on Professor French’s website hosted through 
Dartmouth. 
Monthly returns minus the risk-free rate for that month were regressed by all three 
variables, who’s values were then used to calculate the monthly abnormal returns for the 
different funds. This abnormal return was then regressed against applicable fund flows for the 
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analysis. Like the previous linear regression analyses, there was also an attempt to regress fund 
flows by both the same-month and previous-month risk-adjusted returns. 
  
 
The results of the FFM on the combined data reflects the findings from the CAPM using 
SPX and RUS benchmarks. Both metrics were significant for both strategies, but active funds 
saw much greater significance than that of passive funds (2.46*10-40 and 6.53*10-67 vs. 5.55*10-
12 and 3.17*10-8). Additionally, passive funds were more rewarded for outperformance across 
both metrics over that of active funds ($100 million and $133 million for active versus $309 
million and $263 million for passive). 
Furthermore, the regression was conducted for the split-up data based upon time periods 
to see if there were unique findings by period.  
  
 
Splitting the data lead to some interesting results. The 2007 – 2009 period saw that the 
FFM same-month and previous-month returns were much more significant predictors of fund 
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flows for active funds than passive funds, where previous month returns were not significant for 
passive funds. At the same time, passive funds saw greater return coefficients where a one unit 
increase in same month returns for passive saw inflows of $293 million vs. $157 million for 
active funds. Additionally, a one unit increase in previous month returns saw average fund 
inflows of $143 million for active funds and $130 million for passive funds.  
Over the 2010 – 2019 period, active and passive significance levels were mixed. Passive 
funds saw greater significance in same-month returns of 5.26*10-12 versus active fund 
significance of 2.24*10-9. Previous month returns were the opposite where active funds saw 
greater significance with a p-value of 6.21*10-39 vs. 1.79 *10-8. This reflects what was seen in the 
CAPM analysis. A one unit change in same-month or previous-month risk adjusted returns 
would see greater inflows for passive than active funds. Active funds may see inflows of $57 
million for same month and $126 million for previous month, while passive funds would see 
inflows of $386 million and $314 million for the same metrics. This continues to illustrate that 
investors better reward passive outperformance over potential active outperformance, and at the 
same time during non-crisis periods outperformance is just as if not more significant for passive 
investors than active investors. 
Finally, during the 2020 – 2021 period no passive FFM metric was significant while 
active values were. Overlooking the lack of significance in passive funds, a one unit increase in 
same-month FFM returns would see on average $165 million in fund inflows for active funds 
and $127 million for passive funds. A one unit increase in previous month returns saw $156 
million in active inflows and $224 in passive inflows.  
Overall, both the CAPM and FFM models reflect the assumption that investors are 
rational and seek out outperformance when making fund flow decisions. Both models suggest 
outperformance is a predictor for fund flows for both strategies when using the combined data. 
But passive funds see little to no significance for certain risk-adjusted performance metrics 
during periods for crisis. Furthermore, outperformance significance during periods of normalcy 
(2010 – 2019) are comparable between active and passive funds. At the same time, return 
coefficients across CAPM and FFM metrics reveal that active funds are generally less rewarded 
for outperformance when compared to outperformance from passive funds. This could suggest 
that active funds are increasingly expected to outperform a benchmark and less rewarded for 
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doing so. On the other hand, passive funds may not be expected to outperform a benchmark and 
are more rewarded for doing so. Lastly, different performance metrics show significance during 
different periods, but more research is necessary on why this is the case.  
Conclusion: 
Overall, the findings from our analysis do support the idea that investors are rational and 
look to past performance as a basis for determining positive or negative fund flows. The analysis 
of regressions for absolute and risk-adjusted returns reveals that active investors are generally 
more performance sensitive than passive investors. However, looking at period specific data 
reveals that passive investors see little to no significance during both crises for both risk-adjusted 
and absolute returns, but see similar significance levels to active funds during the 2010 – 2019 
period. This supports previous research from Kenechukwu et al. (2020) which suggests that 
passive investors are less performance sensitive than active investors. However, during periods 
of normalcy (2010 – 2019), passive investors seem to have similar or greater performance 
sensitivity over that of active funds as seen by the FFM and CAPM. Furthermore, return 
coefficients increasingly suggest that passive funds will generally see more inflows over inflows 
of active funds for the same increase in risk-adjusted or absolute returns. On the other hand, 
during crisis periods active funds were slightly better rewarded for an increase in absolute returns 
over that of passive funds. Nevertheless, the performance-flow relationship exists and generally 
rewards passive funds more than active funds for increases in absolute or risk-adjusted returns.  
At the same time, the findings from the analysis also suggest that an active to passive 
shift has occurred, at least historically before the 2020 – 2021 crisis. Data from t-tests suggest 
that 2020 – 2021 was the only period that saw no significant difference between the means of 
active and passive fund flows, which could suggest potential changes in the active-passive 
transition. This is reinforced by summary statistics around both the absolute and risk-adjusted 
returns which saw better mean and median returns from active funds, but it is slightly 
contradicted by the fact that the maximum returns from a fund would generally be from a passive 
fund. Altogether, passive funds have generally seen significant fund inflows over those from 




Extrapolating these findings to the most recent crisis. There was a change in the 
relationship between active and passive fund flows that could potentially suggest changes around 
the active to passive transition hypothesis. At the same time, what is unique about this period is 
that t-tests reveal active and passive returns are increasingly different and the differences are 
increasingly significant. For the more recent crisis, active fund flows have for the first time been 
greater on a sum basis than passive, and future research should focus on the fee gap between the 
two strategies to determine the potential outperformance from active funds over/under those 
from passive funds.  
There were many limitations in the research. Most of the data was pulled from 
Morningstar Direct with very limited ability to check and screen for errors outside of missing or 
null values. At the same time, the data focuses only on a fund’s oldest share class where different 
funds may have multiple share classes and varying returns. The current form of the analysis is 
largely unable to explain the variation in fund flows using performance in part because there was 
an inability to control for different fund sizes or other factors. The returns utilized throughout the 
analysis are before fees, which limit the ability to understand the performance investors receive 
that could be crucial in evaluating the performance-flow relationship.  
For future research, developing a better method or format for fund flows would allow the 
regression model to better explain variations in the data. Utilizing post-fee returns could also 
highlight changes over time for active fund fees and whether a potential fee shrinkage has a 
meaningful effect on the active to passive transition hypothesis. Additionally, further research 
around return coefficients and significance levels would likely provide better insight into how 
active and passive funds differ from each other. Lastly, further analysis of the statistics 
surrounding the 2020 – 2021 period and its place in the active to passive transition or the future 
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